已审阅并标注「安全与防护」的研究与资产。
条目依据已审阅标签归类，同一主题不表示资源之间存在依赖关系。日期保留来源精度，注释保留原语言。
FraudSMSWalker tests browser agents on bilingual SMS-to-webpage fraud judgments while hiding URL and reputation shortcuts. Its controlled chains include difficult benign login/payment cases and evaluate whether classifications remain supported by the visible message and page evidence.
Evaluates action-level guardrails and full computer tasks with environment-dependent safety constraints, separating safe completion from nominal success.
StakeBench evaluates prompt-injection harm to different stakeholders in shopping web-agent workflows. Its executable cases separate attack objectives and assess both outcomes and execution processes to reveal how the same attack pattern can affect different parties.
CAPED filters mobile screenshots before upload by combining task requirements, screen context and parsed UI elements to mask incidental private content. AndroidWorld and a controlled seeded privacy evaluation examine leakage reduction alongside task utility and prototype costs.
Introduces CUA-HandCrafted, a browser-agent red-teaming benchmark that varies attack templates, tasks and system prompts. Its domain comparison and reproducibility audit caution against transferring browser-surface safety conclusions to coding agents or unreleased optimized injections.
MedCUA-Bench evaluates screenshot-only clinical interface workflows using paired intent- and step-level goals. It combines reconstructed medical interfaces with completion and clinical-safety checks, and separately reports results on a real OpenEMR system.
MaskClaw makes local Allow, Mask or Ask decisions before GUI screenshots leave a trusted environment, using visual evidence and personalized policy memory. Its benchmark and designed evolution scenarios test how corrections and edits can become privacy skills checked by a sandbox gate.
MIRAGE constructs mobile screenshot injections in ordinary user-content regions through localization, contextual payload generation and realism curation. Its evaluation separates visual realism from attack effectiveness against pixel-observing GUI agents.
TClone versions live GUI workspaces through snapshots, isolated forks, rollback and selective commit or merge. It separates fast branch creation from durable checkpoints using copy-on-write sharing, filesystem versioning and asynchronous checkpointing, with end-to-end agent-loop latency measurements.
Argues for compiling web tasks into predefined execution graphs before exposing an agent to untrusted runtime content. Its WebArena task analysis identifies typed, semantically complete website tools as a prerequisite and distinguishes this interface proposal from reactive click-level control.
DUDE combines asymmetric hybrid-reward learning with summaries of deceptive-interface failures to guide safer web actions. Its RUC benchmark evaluates deception susceptibility alongside ordinary task performance across interface scenarios.
Evaluates agentic browsers against classical web attacks and visual social-engineering lures beyond indirect prompt injection.
SnapGuard detects screenshot-based prompt injection through complementary visual-stability and recovered textual cues. Its evaluation compares detection quality and inference cost across attack and benign-page settings, rather than establishing universal runtime prevention.
Provides an evaluation toolkit for joint safety, efficiency, and multimodal robustness analysis of operating-system GUI agents.
This study examines UI changes between a desktop agent’s screenshot observation and action dispatch. Its pre-execution state checks address overlay and focus manipulation, while the reported DOM-injection blind spot limits the defense’s coverage.
Organizes security risks and defenses for persistent agent memory into six lifecycle phases and proposes five verifiable governance primitives.
Introduces PriceBlind, a visual perturbation method for controlled screenshot-based evaluation of price-constrained multimodal agents. The reported transfer experiments use a simplified single-turn coordinate-selection protocol.
WebAgentGuard separates prompt-injection detection from the operating web agent through a parallel multimodal guard. The guard is trained on synthetic visual/textual examples using reasoning-focused supervised fine-tuning followed by reinforcement learning.
Introduces CORA, which calibrates a risk model to choose between executing and abstaining from mobile GUI actions, then diagnoses rejected actions to suggest interventions. Phone-Harm provides step-level safety labels for evaluating this safeguarding process.
This study tests black-box GUI-grounding failures caused by strategically added, innocuous-looking UI elements. Its iterative overlay search is compared with random injection and repeated independent grounding trials to distinguish persistent misdirection from incidental clutter.
WebSP-Eval evaluates agents carrying out website security and privacy tasks such as preference changes and session management. A browser extension controls account and initial state across runs, enabling analysis of failures on stateful UI controls.
Compares four human oversight strategies during live web-agent sessions, examining exposure to problematic actions and opportunities to intervene. The analysis identifies timing and attention problems in control handoffs and upfront plan approval.
Studies persistent web-agent memory contamination introduced through environmental observations instead of direct memory access. Experiments on WebArena and VisualWebArena examine cross-session effects and how interaction failures alter susceptibility.
Introduces MyPhoneBench to verify whether phone-use agents minimize personal data disclosure when filling forms during benign mobile tasks.
Proposes a split-compute browser defense pairing a local visual sentinel, a cloud planner, and deterministic policy enforcement against indirect prompt injection.
AgentRAE studies notification-based visual backdoors that redirect mobile GUI-agent actions. Its training separates sensitivity to icon differences from trigger/action association, with evaluations of clean behavior and targeted redirection.
MANA combines visual, temporal and exploration signals to guide navigation toward mobile advertisements. It evaluates ad detection and interaction cost on commercial smartphones, including obfuscated-ad cases.
Presents a man-in-the-middle network red-teaming framework for evaluating autonomous OpenClaw agents under live traffic manipulation.
WebPII provides synthetic e-commerce screenshots with fine-grained annotations for sensitive information, including partially filled forms and transaction identifiers. It also trains WebRedact to detect visual PII as a privacy component for computer-use agents.
This public red-teaming study evaluates indirect prompt injection that both changes agent behavior and hides the compromise from the final response. Its scenarios include computer use alongside tool calling and coding, with analyses of transfer and model-dependent vulnerability.
Formalizes a visual confused-deputy failure in which a computer agent acts on a misperceived UI object. A separate guardrail checks both the visual target and the agent's action reasoning against deployment-specific knowledge before permitting execution.
Studies webpage injections that affect both screenshots and accessibility trees, then trains web agents through teacher imitation, supervised adversarial examples, and adversarial reinforcement learning. The evaluation tests defenses on MiniWoB++ and held-out tasks.
Identifies time-of-check to time-of-use (TOCTOU) race vulnerabilities when web pages mutate between agent planning and action execution.
Formalizes and measures natural agentic oversharing when browser agents handle private user emails and calendars across live websites.
This survey organizes agent skills by architecture, acquisition, deployment and security, including their role in computer-use systems and GUI grounding. It also proposes a permission and lifecycle governance framework for skill deployment.
Next-Gen CAPTCHAs introduces generated interactive challenges intended to distinguish human users from GUI agents. The benchmark targets perception, memory, decisions and actions, with backend-supported challenge types designed for scalable instance generation.
MisActBench provides action-level labels for task alignment, while DeAction checks proposed computer-use actions and requests revisions through structured feedback. The paper separately evaluates offline detection and interactive operation in OSWorld and RedTeamCUA.
An anonymization framework replaces sensitive screen content and instructions with consistent, type-preserving placeholders while mediating actions through a local interaction proxy. Experiments on AndroidLab and PrivScreen examine the privacy–utility trade-off when mobile GUI agents operate over these transformed interfaces.
WebSentinel identifies suspicious webpage segments and checks each against its surrounding page context to detect and locate prompt injections. Its evaluation uses both contaminated and clean webpage datasets.
SafePred uses world-model risk forecasts to guide action filtering and task replanning. Its desktop and web safety evaluations distinguish policy compliance, task success and success under the specified policy.
Introduces GUIGuard-Bench, which annotates private regions in GUI trajectories with categories, risk levels, and relevance to the user’s task. It evaluates privacy recognition and the effect of screenshot protection on offline planning and task utility.
MirrorGuard trains a reasoning-correction defense using GUI risk trajectories generated in a text-based neural-symbolic simulator. It evaluates whether corrections transfer to computer-use agents operating real interfaces, keeping simulated training separate from deployment tests.
Studies action-rebinding attacks in which an Android GUI agent’s planned input is redirected to a different application during the observation–action delay. The evaluation examines cross-application execution and the consequences of treating an earlier screen as the current action target.
NOVA separates trusted task planning from screen-derived observations by producing a branching plan before execution and resolving runtime values through perception. Its OSWorld study examines security and utility while identifying remaining risks from perception-driven branch steering.
Introduces WebTrap Park, a platform that turns web-agent security risks into executable tasks and assesses concrete interactions with live pages. It compares agent frameworks without requiring modifications to their implementations.
Studies deceptive social-engineering web patterns targeting browser automation agents and proposes defenses against bait-based manipulation.
Introduces TRAP, which evaluates task-redirection attacks embedded in realistic web interfaces. Controlled website clones and a modular injection framework support comparisons of persuasion techniques and contextual changes across agents.
ceLLMate constrains browser-agent authority through an extension that applies policies at the HTTP layer. It evaluates this sandbox against prompt-injection attacks in WASP, avoiding dependence on brittle low-level click and keystroke policies.
Presents a privacy evaluation framework for browser agents covering component weaknesses, website defenses, tracking, privacy-related prompts and personal-data leakage. The framework is applied to deployed browser-agent tools.
Reports architectural and security lessons from building a browser agent, including hybrid accessibility-tree and visual context, browser tooling and programmatic constraints. A WebGames evaluation accompanies the discussion of reliability and specialization.
Applies dual-task adversarial perturbations to mobile screenshots to conceal personally identifiable information from untrusted MLLM routers while preserving agent task utility.
Measures how untrusted third-party notifications, messages, and app content can hijack mobile LLM agents into executing unauthorized cross-app actions.
Introduces MobileRisk-Live and OS-Sentinel, combining a formal verifier for system-level violations with a multimodal judge for contextual risks in mobile GUI workflows.
Presents LiteAgent for recording web-agent interactions and TrickyArena for enabling or disabling dark patterns in controlled websites. Experiments compare how individual patterns, combined patterns and visual or HTML changes affect agent decisions.
Introduces CORE, which divides mobile UI hierarchies into semantic blocks and shares planning between local and cloud language models. Local ranking limits the screen information sent for cloud-side element selection, with a multi-round mechanism for correcting inadequate context.
Proposes an in-browser fuzzing framework that uses language-model guidance to test indirect prompt-injection vulnerabilities in agentic browsers. The work focuses on unwanted actions triggered by webpage instructions under the browser agent's user privileges.
Introduces HackWorld for evaluating visual computer-use agents in a capture-the-flag collection of web applications. The benchmark examines interface navigation and multistep planning during vulnerability discovery and exploitation tasks.
Introduces SusBench, an online benchmark that inserts dark-pattern designs into consumer websites for agent evaluation. A human study checks the realism of the interventions, and agent trials compare susceptibility across pattern types.
Introduces SecureWebArena with simulated interactive websites, an attack-vector taxonomy and labeled agent trajectories. Its evaluation separates failures in reasoning, behavioral traces and task outcomes across vision-language agent families.
Uses the near-zero contact-touch signals of automated mobile agents to expose malicious visual content selectively during agent interactions. The paper combines this agent-only perceptual injection with HG-IDA* prompt optimization to study unauthorized cross-app actions.
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